




This paper proposes a simple general equilibrium theory of agrarian pro-
duction organization to explain the emergence and persistence of latifundia -
minifundia type patterns of agrarian production organization such as have pre-
vailed historically in many parts of Latin America. When land ownership is
concentrated, the exercise of market power over land can facilitate the exercise
of control over labor, as labor supply to landlord estates is aﬀected by peasant
access to land. Equilibria may emerge where landlords, behaving as multi-
market Cournot oligopolists, ineﬃciently hoard land to drive up land rentals
and corral cheaper labor into their expanding estates. Labor-service tenancy
arrangements, similar to those used in practice, emerge as landlords try to
price discriminate. These contracts help to restore allocative ineﬃciency but
lead to lower equilibrium peasant wages and welfare. Population growth, dif-
ferential technical progress on landlord and peasant farms, and other changes
in the physical and economic environment are shown to transform equilibrium
patterns of agrarian production organization in ways that are consistent with
agrarian trajectories observed in late nineteenth century Chile and several other
regions and periods. The model also clariﬁes how agents’ incentives to challenge
property rights change along with equilibrium agrarian structures.
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11 Introduction
Although the regions of North and Latin America were both established as European
colonies with similarly abundant natural resources and high land to labor ratios, they
soon embarked on divergent development paths. Economists otherwise fond of em-
p h a s i z i n gt h er o l eo ff a c t o re n d o w m e n t sa n dp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hi ns h a p i n gt h ep a t ho f
economic growth and structural transformation have had to fall back on explanations
that emphasize the diﬀerent nature and quality of the institutions and cultures of the
regions to explain this divergence. Yet such explanations are not entirely convinc-
ing, and remain incomplete until they can clarify how these institutions and cultures
change, or fail to change, over time. They al s of a i lt oa c c o u n tf o rt h es u b s t a n t i a l
divergence of outcomes within Latin America amongst countries that share common
colonial heritage, culture and religion.
A more compelling story, emphasized in recent scholarship by Engerman and
Sokoloﬀ (2000), attributes much of the divergence to Latin America’s much higher
initial inequality. For example, while the Spanish crown granted vast tracts of land
and substantial control over indigenous labor to a small number of original colonizers,
the settlers to the North American colonies arrived to no such privileges (the slave-
owning US South merits a separate discussion). According to Engerman and Sokoloﬀ
the highly skewed distribution of resources in Latin America led to slower growth
by contributing to “the evolution of political, legal, and economic institutions that
were less favorable toward full participation in the commercial economy by a broad
spectrum of the population.” This in turn shaped the evolution of land policy itself.
Whereas the political process in the United States led to the recognition of property
rights to thousands of squatters and small settlers (de Soto, 2000) and to the opening
of vast frontier regions to successive waves of immigrant settlers, landowning elites
in Latin America inﬂuenced the political process to limit and curtail the ability of
independent small farmers to establish or maintain lasting property rights in newly
opened frontier regions (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
While the large haciendas of New Spain initially relied upon compulsory Indian
labor drafts, most such practices were abolished by the crown as early as 1632, and
1landlords had to ﬁnd other ways to secure labor for production under conditions
of labor scarcity. This gave rise to the numerous institutional adaptations such as
labor-service tenancy, and shaped the pattern of agrarian organization for decades
and centuries to come. As late as the mid twentieth century, agrarian production
organization in many parts of Latin America was still marked by the predominance of
large landlord estates, or latifundia. Labor on the estates was provided by attached
workers and labor-service tenants living within the estates, or by temporary workers
drawn from surrounding communities of very small peasant farms, or minifundia,
that often co-existed nearby.1 In North America similar crops were instead produced
by a large number of independent family farms.
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ and others have argued that the more egalitarian pattern
of land ownership and production organization in North America led to faster growth
by creating better incentives for work and innovation, as well as by engendering more
competition and broader credit markets, and more eﬀective governance structures for
local taxation and investments in public education.
The story sounds persuasive, but a number of problems appear as one attempts to
formalize such arguments. Most fundamental is the question: Why should initial land
inequality have led to persistently ineﬃcient allocations and slower growth? Why
couldn’t the issues of eﬃciency have been separated from the problems of distribution?
If the pattern of farm production organization in the United States was more eﬃcient
and generated faster skill accumulation because of the better work incentives facing
independent farm operators, then why did not Latin America’s landlords choose to sell
their lands, or ﬁll up their estates with tenancies, to cash in on the higher land values
that such a more eﬃcient pattern of production organization would have engendered?
Historically Latin America has in fact cultivated a much smaller fraction of its
agricultural land under tenancy than counterpart regions in Europe, Asia, or the
United States and Canada.2 Why would such an apparently ineﬃcient pattern of
production organization persist for so very long? Most commonly advanced answers
to this question fail to adequately or completely explain the facts. Several of such
1For descriptions of agrarian production organization in Latin America and their evolution over
time see for example Bauer (1975), Bulmer-Thomas (1994), Chevalier (1963), Binswanger and
Deinenger(1995) and Pearse (1975).
2Hayami and Otsuka (1993), Binswanger and Deinenger (1995), and Conning and Robinson
(2001) provide comparative statistics and discussion on this topic.
2alternative arguments — such as economies of scale, landlord myopia, landlords more
concerned about status rents than proﬁts, credit market imperfections, diﬀerential
skills and management ability, etc. — are discussed in more detail below.
One argument that might plausibly account for the absence of more active tenancy
and land sale markets in many parts of Latin America is that landlords have chosen
to organize production, and manipulate politics in the ways that they did because
it helped them to extract monopoly rents over land, and by extension, monopsony
rents over labor. Henry George expressed this monopoly-cum-monopsony succinctly,
if crudely, more than a century ago in this famous passage:
P l a c eo n eh u n d r e dm e no na ni s l a n df r o mw h i c ht h e r ei sn oe s c a p e ,a n d
whether you make one of these men the absolute owner of the other ninety-
nine, or the absolute owner of the soil of the island, will make no diﬀerence
either to him or to them ... In the one case, as the other, the one will be
the absolute master of the ninety-nine—his power extending even to life
and death, for simply to refuse them permission to live upon the island
would be to force them into the sea. (Henry George, Progress and Poverty,
1879: 347-348).
While George’s example is clearly extreme, it captures the essential idea that
landlords might be able to take advantage of market power in the land market to also
exercise market power over labor. In practice landlords’ could exercise such market
power by limiting peasant households’ access to land via tenancies or land sales,
although their ability to do so will naturally be limited by the extent of competition
with other landlords and by other constraints derived from the economic environment.
The purpose of this paper is precisely to explore how factor endowments, the
initial distribution of property rights, the nature of production technologies, the dis-
tribution of skills in the population, the extent of competition between landlords,
and other elements in the economic environment might aﬀect equilibrium patterns of
agrarian production organization via their impact on landlords’ endogenously deter-
mined ability to exercise market power. The model also helps to clarify the historical
circumstances under which elites might want to block or enable peasant access to fron-
tier land or redeﬁne property rights over land in other ways via political or extra-legal
3means.3
To understand the argument, consider the simplest case of a single landlord sur-
rounded by a fringe of landless or small-landowning peasant households. When initial
land inequality is high, the landlord naturally owns a large fraction of this economy’s
land endowment. As the standard partial-equilibrium analysis of non-price discrim-
inating monopoly tells us, this landlord would attempt to drive up the rental price
of land by withholding land from the lease market. In a general equilibrium setting
there is another eﬀect, however. By restricting peasants’ access to land, landlords
may also lower the marginal product of labor on peasant farms, and therefore aﬀect
the peasant sectors’ willingness to supply labor to the landlord estate at any given
wage.
Landlords’ optimal markup pricing decisions must consider the interaction be-
tween these land monopoly and labor monopsony market power eﬀects — henceforth
labeled ‘monopsoly’ eﬀects for short — leading to equilibria where landlords increase
the size of their production estates and use overly land-intensive production tech-
niques in comparison to the competitive equilibrium. Peasant producers will in turn
be lead by distorted equilibrium factor prices to employ overly labor-intensive tech-
niques on ineﬃciently small farms. The resulting economy will therefore display the
characteristic inverse farm size - productivity relationship that has been empirically
noted in several contexts (Berry and Cline, 1979; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Cornia,
1985; Kevane, 1996). These arguments are readily extended to the case of com-
peting landlords in a multi-market Cournot oligopoly (or ‘oligopsoly’) game, with
the expected result. When the distribution of initial property rights becomes more
egalitarian, and/or where competition amongst landlords is more intense, the usual
neo-classical eﬃcient competitive market equilibrium re-emerges.
The model also yields interesting predictions regarding how equilibrium agrarian
structures would be transformed over time in response to population growth, diﬀeren-
tial rates of technical progress on landlord and peasant farms, property rights reforms,
and other changes. These predictions make sense of important historical transfor-
mations in agrarian production organization that appear puzzling within standard
neo-classical economic analyses. For example, I show that under certain conditions
3On this last point, see Nugent and Robinson’s (1998) interesting account of the comparative
political economy of coﬀee production organization and land policy in diﬀerent countries of Latin
America.
4skill accumulation, technical advancements, or increases in the proﬁtability of pro-
duction that increase labor demand on landlord farms relative to the peasant sector
may actually lead to lower equilibrium wages by increasing landlords’ ability to ex-
ercise market power. I review historical evidence to suggest that such an outcome
may have occurred during the wheat export boom that helped consolidate Chilean
landlord estates in the late nineteenth century (Bauer, 1975) or in the consolidation
of coﬀee export estates in Central America.
This leads us to the question of politics. If initial land concentration is suﬃciently
high, and/or the productivity on landlord estates is raised relative to peasant farms
the monopsony rents that landlords stand to capture by aﬀecting peasant labor supply
may become suﬃciently large that landlords decide not only to withhold land from
the lease market but to encroach on peasant land. Where peasant property rights
over land are secure, this process would be mediated by transactions on the land
market as landlords bought or leased-in peasant land. But where property rights
enforcement is an endogenous outcome, landlords may prefer instead to limit peasant
access to land by using political inﬂuence or extra-legal coercion. Thus although
the focus of the model is primarily on equilibrium allocations under secure property
r i g h t s ,t h i sp a p e rd e r i v e sr e s u l t st h a tp o i n tt op r e d i c t i o n sa b o u tt h el i k e l i h o o da n d
timing of land grabs, enclosures, squatting, land reform and violence.4
As is well understood, in a constant returns production environment, more than
one market distortion must be present if ineﬃcient equilibrium outcomes are to
emerge. In our model the market-power distortion arises because of landlords inability
to perfectly price-discriminate.5 Interestingly, the contracts that price discriminating
landlords would employ closely resemble the type of labor-service tenancy arrange-
ments that were widely prevalent well into the twentieth century in Chile, Bolivia,
Peru and several other countries of Central and South America. These arrangements,
in which tenants went by names such as inquilinos, yanaconas, peones encasillados,
or huasipungueros depending on the region, required tenants to provide labor service
4A related paper by Conning and Robinson (2001) presents a model with political-economic
equilibria that determine both the extent of property rights security and the pattern of agrarian
production organization. Their model however uses a less general linear production technology and
makes fewer predictions about production organization within landlord estates.
5See Kevane (1996) for an extended discussion of this issue. Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak
(2000) show why to be eﬀective tenancy market reforms must simultaneously regulate more than
one dimension of the contract.
5to the landlords’s estate as a condition for obtaining access to a small plot of land.6
The model shows that eﬀorts to regulate such contracts, for example by requiring
that landlords pay a uniform daily wage, can lead landlords ineﬃciently to further
reduce the area under tenancy and/or to expel tenants. Such a pattern is consistent
with the historical experience of several countries (de Janvry, 1981). Interestingly,
the general equilibrium impact of such regulations may be to raise peasant house-
hold wages and welfare even though it may result in a more ineﬃcient pattern of
production organization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief literature review, ﬁve
scenarios are analyzed to compare the impact of initial land inequality on equilibrium
resource allocation and household welfare: (1) a Chayanovian economy characterized
by complete factor market autarky, (2) the eﬃcient competitive factor markets equi-
librium, (3) an economy under the assumption that landlords can exercise full market
power via perfect collusion and price discrimination, (4) Monopoly-cum-monopsony
(or ‘monopsoly’) equilibria where a single landlord exercises market power but is lim-
ited to charging a uniform wage and rentalr a t et ot h em a r k e t ,a n d( 5 )a ne x t e n s i o n
to a multi-market oligopoly Cournot game between competing landlords. Several
properties of these equilibria are illustrated using a Cobb-Douglas parameterization.
The remaining sections of the paper explore how the equilibrium pattern of agrarian
organization responds to changes in the underlying economic environment, and in par-
ticular to changes in the initial assignment of property rights, population growth, and
technological change and skill accumulation. I also discuss why land sales markets
fail and discuss agents’incentives to challenge or protect property rights via political
or extra-legal means. A ﬁnal section concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
The idea that landlords understood that they could aﬀect peasants’ willingness to sup-
ply cheap labor by limiting their access to land and other productive opportunities has
been widely discussed by economists and historians in many contexts. Binswanger,
Deininger and Feder (1995) catalog many historical episodes in Africa, Latin America,
6Sadoulet (1992) analyzed a model of labor service tenancies in Chile based on moral hazard
and limited liability. I argue in this paper however that labor service contracts could have arisen
in conditions similar to those analyzed by Sadoulet even in the absence of moral hazard or credit
market imperfections.
6Europe and Asia where similar processes appear to have been at work. Even in the
United States, following abolition, many southern states enacted ‘Black codes’ that
featured strict anti-vagrancy laws, hunting regulations, and limits on freed slaves’
access to land and credit. There is little doubt that the primary purpose of these
laws was to restrict black laborers’ ability to establish new independent production
opportunities and hence to help maintain their supply of labor to plantation ﬁelds
(Hahn, 1982; Moore, 1965).
Although these issues are historically important, few formal analyses of the topic
exist. Koo (1982), responding to Griﬃn (1974) posed the question of whether and
how monopoly power in the land market might facilitate monopsony power over the
labor market, but his was a partial-equilibrium analysis and therefore remained spec-
ulative and inconclusive in many of its results. Anderson Schaﬀner (1995) analyzed
a model that showed how landlords could increase their market power by encour-
aging a culture of servility and limited time horizons amongst their attached labor
force. More recent work by Robinson and Baland (2000) and Conning and Robin-
son (2000), examined how high levels of land inequality and ineﬃcient production
organization might persist as political-economic equilibria, but these papers focus on
simpler production environments and hence do not capture all the essential micro-
level tradeoﬀs. The contribution of the present paper is to explain why ineﬃcient
production organization patterns might arise and persist as equilibrium outcomes
in a much more general production environment, without appealing to information
asymmetries, credit market imperfections, politics or special preferences.
In a formal sense this paper is most closely related to a small literature on general
equilibrium trade models with a monopsony distortions (Feenstra, 1981; Markusen
and Robson, 1980; and McCulloch and Yellen, 1980).7 The present analysis diﬀers
from this earlier analysis however, not only in application, but also because it extends
these earlier analyses in several new directions. Most signiﬁcantly, the introduction
of non-traded factors suggesting a relaxation of the assumption of constant returns
to scale leading to a determinate pattern of operational farm sizes opens the door to
analyzing how the initial allocation of traded and non-traded assets and elements of
the economic environment, including very importantly the nature of the production
7Robert Feenstra wrote a ﬁrst draft of his well-cited 1981 paper in the Journal of International
Economics as part of an undergraduate thesis.
7technology, aﬀects equilibrium agrarian structures as well as agents incentives to
protect or transform property rights.
This paper is also related to Eswaran and Kotwal’s seminal 1986 general equilib-
rium model of agrarian production organization. In that paper the authors posited a
trade-oﬀ between a labor market imperfection which favored small farm producers,
and ﬁxed production costs and a credit market imperfection which favored larger
farms. The initial distribution of land property rights matters in their competitive
markets model because at high levels of inequality, larger farms are favored on the
credit market and small farm production is squeezed out. The trade-oﬀ in our model
is between what can be interpreted as a labor market imperfection (e.g. non-traded
labor supervision abilities or farming skills) which favors small and medium farm
production, and the exercise of market power which naturally favors larger farms.
Although Eswaran and Kotwal’s account complementary to our own, the produc-
tion organization patterns are arguably more robust and persistent. One can argue
that “time and markets” ought to eventually help small farm households overcome
many of the trading frictions they face in Eswaran and Kotwal’s static setting. If,
for example, peasant households cannot borrow to lease in land, they might instead
save over time to purchase or lease land. A recent paper by Carter and Zimmer-
man (2000) showed that time and markets did indeed help an Eswaran and Kotwal
type economy inch toward a more eﬃcient allocation, although they showed that the
transition could be slow.
In our model, time and credit markets need not repair the distorted economy. The
land sale market continues to fail over time for precisely the same reason that it fails
in a one period setting: because landlords will not undercut their own market power
by leasing out a more eﬃcient level of land and entry is limited by the fact that land
is a non-reproducible factor. Arguably, a longer time horizon might even further limit
transactions on the land market, by facilitating collusive behavior amongst landlords.
It could also, as analyzed below, lead to a skewed pattern of skill accumulation and
technological change that further reinforces monopsoly power eﬀects.
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2.1 Preliminaries
The economy has T units of cultivable land and there are L households with one unit
of labor each. The economy-wide land to labor ratio is therefore t = T/L.T h e r e
are λL landlord and (1−λ)L peasant households. Without loss of generality assume
that L is large and λ is small and λL is always an integer number of households.
The λL landlord households own θT units of land while peasant households own
the remaining (1 − θ)T units. The average peasant household therefore owns
(1−θ)t
(1−λ)
units, and for the moment all peasant households will be assumed to have the same
initial land endowment. The land Gini coeﬃcient for this stylized economy can then
be calculated easily to be [θ − λ].
A single tradable good such as wheat or rice is produced and consumed in the
economy at a price ﬁx e da tu n i t yb yt r a d ew i t ht h ew o r l dm a r k e t . 8 Households max-
imize utility from consumption subject to their budget constraints, with household
income derived from farm proﬁts and factor sales. To keep the model simple, leisure
time is excluded from the household utility function, so households will inelastically
supply their entire labor endowment to either own farm production or to the labor
market. This last assumption can be relaxed readily without substantially altering
the results to follow.
Both landlord and peasant households have access to the same production tech-
nology represented by the production function b F(T,L,S) which is assumed to be
linearly homogenous in its three arguments: land T,labor L, and farming skill or la-
bor supervision ability S. b F is a standard concave production function with FTL > 0,
FTS > 0,F LS > 0. Factor S i sa s s u m e dt ob en o n - t r a d e d ,a n df o rt h em o m e n te a c h
household is assumed to have the same endowment, S =1 . This assumption, which
actually penalizes the exercise of market power because it makes large scale farm
production ineﬃcient, will later be relaxed.
Given these assumptions, it is notationally convenient to work with the restricted
8This assumption is not an unreasonable assumption. Latifundia ﬂourished in several Latin
American countries under liberal trading regimes and exported agricultural products for much of
the nineteenth and early part of the 20th century (de Janvry, 1981). Bauer (1971) argues that the
Chilean system of labor-service tenancy or inquilinaje became ﬁrmly rooted during the wheat export
boom of the 1860’s.
9production function F(T,L)=b F(T,L,1) which is clearly homogenous of degree
k ≤ 1 in its arguments T and L. The function F satisﬁes the Inada end-point
conditions F(T,0) = F(0,L)=0 ,F T(0,L)=FL(T,0) for all T and L. For notational
clarity, we will sometimes indicate the landlord’s production function by G(T,L)
so as to distinguish it from the peasant’s F(T,L),e v e nt h o u g hw em a i n t a i nt h a t
G(T,L)=F(T,L) for several sections to come.
When k<1 the production function F(T,L) is decreasing returns to scale in land
and labor inputs. Since all households have access to the same production function,
as described below, eﬃciency will require equal operational farm sizes and the same
land and labor use across farms.
2.2 Autarkic and competitive equilibria benchmarks
Consider ﬁrst how equilibrium allocations change with the initial land distribution
parameter θ under the assumption of complete factor market autarchy. Since each
peasant farm owns one unit labor and (1−θ)t/(1 −λ) units of land, output on each
peasant farm is F((1−θ)t/(1−λ),1) and F(θt/λ,1) on each landlord farm. Economy-
wide output will be at an eﬃcient maximum level only under full land equality, or
when θ = λ since only then can land to labor ratios, and hence shadow factor prices,
equalize across farms. By the assumption of diminishing returns, landlord income
will be increasing, and peasant income falling, with θ. For inegalitarian land holdings
(θ > λ), deadweight-loss rises with θ because greater land inequality can only widen
the gap between shadow factor prices and hence allocative ineﬃciency. Chayanovian
(autarchy) payoﬀs to landlord and peasant households (V a








P(t,θ)=F((1 − θ)t/(1 − λ),1)
In a competitive equilibrium, by contrast, both landlord and peasant maximize
proﬁts and income by setting the marginal product of each factor of production on
their farm equal to that equilibrium market price for that factor. Production organi-
zation will be eﬃcient as marginal products equalize across farms. If we denote each
10peasant household’s competitive net supply of each factor by Tc and Lc respectively,




















on the land market, and an analogous condition GL(·,·)=w = FL(·,·) holds on the
labor market, where r and w are equilibrium market land rental and wage labor rates
respectively. When the production technology is homogenous of degree k<1 and S
is the same across households, and because all households face the same factor prices,
both landlords and peasants will choose to operate at the same eﬃcient operational
farm size, denoted by T∗(r,w) and L∗(r,w). Every farm will therefore also earn the
same positive farm proﬁt Π(r,w;S). Farm proﬁt corresponds in eﬀect to the rental
rate on the non-traded factor S.
Since economy-wide demand for land is LT∗(w,r) and the economy-wide supply
of land is T , the equilibrium level of land use which clears the market is simply
T∗(r,w)=t, which is just the economy-wide land to labor ratio. Similarly, a labor
market equilibrium is given by LL∗(r,w)=L so L∗ =1 , and each household supplies
as much labor as it demands.9 Equilibrium factor prices are therefore given simply
by r = FT(t,1) and w = FL(t,1).
Each peasant household’s net supply of land is therefore Tc = t(1−θ)/(1−λ)−t,
or Tc =
(λ−θ)
(1−λ)t. The entire peasant sector’s net demand for land, (θ−λ)t, is obviously
equal to the landlord sectors’ net supply of land. As long as θ > λ,which is just a
statement that a landlord owns more land than the economy-wide average level of
land per capita, the landlord sector’s supply of land to the market will be a linear
increasing function of θ.
Economy-wide income is simply LF(t,1), the combined value of production on
all L farms. Landlord income is given by farm proﬁts plus the market value of their
factor endowment, or equivalently, by the value of farm production plus net factor
sales priced at market prices. Landlord and peasant household incomes can thus be
9This would obviously change if household labor endowment varied in the population, if house-
holds had diﬀerent holdings of S, or access to diﬀerent production technologies.

















2.3 Market power equilibria with price discrimination
Suppose that landlords can collude perfectly as a group to maximize their total in-
come, as would a single large landowner who can price discriminate. To maximize
their income from proﬁts and factor sales, landlords will organize production ef-
ﬁciently and then extract the gains to trade with peasants by separately oﬀering
take-it-or-leave-it contracts to each peasant household.
Formally the landlord’s contract design problem can be seen as that of choosing
each peasant household’s factor supplies Td and Ld and a lump-sum rental R payment
level to maximize the value of production on the hacienda plus lump-sum rentals,
subject only to the constraint that each peasant household be willing to participate


















(1−λ)t − Td,1 − Ld
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Each landlord can be thought of as contracting with (1 − λ)/λ peasants. The par-
ticipation constraint must bind, as otherwise landlords could increase the objective
function by raising R while still satisfying the constraint. This binding constraint
yields an expression for R. Substituting this into the objective function, and then
diﬀerentiating with respect to Td and Ld l e a d st oan e ws e to fﬁrst order conditions
that exactly match the ﬁrst-order conditions for the eﬃcient competitive case (1)
analyzed above. Production will therefore be organized as eﬃciently as before, but






















Each landlord receives the value of production on his own farm plus rental income
from subtenancies. Rental income from each of the (1 − λ)/λ tenants is set to R =
12F(t,1)−F
¡
(1 − θ)t/(1 − λ),1
¢
, or the value of peasant production less that tenant’s
autarchy reservation payoﬀ.
Note that eﬃcient price discrimination will in general require non-linear tariﬀs
with landlords setting a diﬀerent level of R matched to the endowment and charac-
teristics of each peasant household. This is obscured slightly here by the assumption
that all peasant households have identical endowments. To see this, suppose that the
(1 −λ)L peasant households were instead now divided into small landowning house-
holds with
2(1−θ)
(1−λ) t<t units of land each and an equal number of landless households.
Landlords would require landless peasant households to pay R0 = F(t,1) − F(0,1)
for access to t units of land while requiring landowning peasants to pay R1 =
F(t,1) − F
¡
2(1 − θ)t/(1 − λ),1
¢
for access to t − 2(1 − θ)t/(1 − λ)=−Td units
of land. The payment rate is tied to the peasant household’s factor endowment in
a non-linear way: landless peasants are charged higher rentals per unit land because
they have less attractive fall-back options.
These contracts can be interpreted as interlinked labor-service tenancy contracts
such as those that have been noted historically in Latin America and other parts
of the world. Under a labor service tenancy landlords require peasant households
to supply labor services as a condition of access to land leases. To see this more
clearly, suppose that as in the previous paragraph, there are landowning and landless
peasants but that landlord households now start with a larger stock of farming skill
S. Eﬃciency requires landlords to farm at a larger operational scale than peasants in
equilibrium, and landlords will therefore now have a positive net demand for labor.
As above, landlords maximize their proﬁts by oﬀering take-it-or-leave-it ‘package deal’
contracts: in exchange for access to Td
i units of land, peasant households must pay Ri
in rent and promise to deliver Ld
i units of labor to the landlord estate, where i =0 ,1
corresponds to landless and small landowner peasant households respectively.
Requiring tenants or serfs to provide labor services in return for access to land
and other services was a widespread institutional practice for centuries in Europe
and elsewhere. In their classic account, The Rise of the Western World, North and
Thomas (1973) ask, “Why did the lord require labor services rather than simply take
a share of the serf’s output?” Their simple answer is that “there was no organized
market for goods and services. (p.20)” This explanation seems implausible, however,
as it suggests that labor service tenancy would dissappear as monetization proceeded.
13Yet labor service tenancy arrangements survived in many parts of Europe until well
into the nineteenth century, and in Latin America in countries such as Chile until well
into the middle part of the twentieth century (de Janvry, 1981). Ironically, North
and Thomas themselves provide evidence that the labor service obligations might
have been related to landlords’ ability to exercise economic (and political) power a
few sentences later when they write: “The key to the contractual arrangement was
labor services in return for the lord’s protection ... the classic manor persisted as long
as the initial conditions of chaos, abundant land, diﬀerential military endowments,
and scarce labor prevailed.”
Sadoulet (1992) argues that labor service tenancy emerges where landlords ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to monitor peasant labor eﬀort yet peasants’ wealth does not allow credible
commitments to ﬁxed rent lease payments in the event of crop failure. This seems
a plausible element of the story, but once again, “time and markets” ought to have
helped to relax what is in eﬀect a binding credit constraint, and would expand the set
of feasible contracts to get around the problem. The analysis of this paper suggests
that labor service would have been a feature of an optimal contract even in a fully
monetized economy and with or without credit market imperfections.
2.4 Monopoly cum Monopsony equilibria (with no price dis-
crimination)
Landlords cannot always tailor the terms of their contracts to each peasant house-
hold’s outside opportunities. This might be because they are limited from doing so
by law or by competition from other sectors, or because they cannot easily condi-
tion on peasant’s outside opportunities. For example, de Janvry (1981) notes how
over a number of years landlords were led to transform their labor-service inquilinos
into wage laborers by new laws that required landlords to pay uniform minimum
agricultural daily wages in cash.
So suppose that landlords now must hire in all labor and lease out all land at uni-
form wage or rental rates w and r. As in the classic partial equilibrium analysis of
monopoly power, landlords may strategically choose to withhold land from the lease
market in an eﬀort to drive up the land rental rate. By virtue of his concentrated
landholdings, a large landlord, however, also exercises monopsony power over labor
because limiting the supply of land to the peasant sector can aﬀect the marginal prod-
14uct of peasant farm labor and hence labor supply to the market. As landlords must
consider both monopoly and monopsony eﬀects, we label what follows the analysis
of ‘monopsoly’ power. A subsequent section extends the model to the ‘oligopsoly’
power.
To ﬁnd the landlord’s optimum, we ﬁrst must derive an expression for peasant
household net factor supply to the market as a function of oﬀered factor prices. Let
Tu and Lu indicate the peasant household’s optimal use of land and labor on its
own production project for given factor prices w and r. Because peasants take factor











The ﬁrst order conditions for a peasant optimum are FT = r and FL = w.T h i s
set of equations can in turn be solved to yield expressions L∗(w,r) and T∗(w,r) for
optimal factor use as a function of the wage and rental rate. The net-supply of each










In what follows it will be more convenient to work with inverse oﬀ-farm net factor
supply functions w(Tm,L m) and r(Tm,L m). These summarize the wage and rental
rate at which a given pair of factor net supplies Tm,L m will be oﬀered by the peasant
























In equilibrium, total net supply of each factor from the (1−λ)L peasant households
will equal the landlord’s net demand for the same factor. Each landlord’s land and
labor use can thus be written as Tu = θ
λt+
(1−λ)
λ Tm and Lu =1 +
(1−λ)
λ Lm respectively.
15Substituting these into (3), the landlord cartel can be thought of as choosing Lm and
Tm to maximize farm proﬁts plus net factor sales for each landlord:
V
m














































The ﬁrst condition is just a modiﬁed version of the standard land monopolist’s rule
for hiring out land until marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The direct marginal
cost of leasing out an additional unit in terms of foregone output on the landlord
estate is
δG(·,·)
δTm . The marginal revenue is the rental rate r a tw h i c ht h a tu n i ti sh i r e d
out plus the marginal negative eﬀect on rental earnings from inframarginal leases due
to the fact that the rental rate must be lowered to get the peasant sector to demand
this extra land. The ﬁnal term captures the marginal impact on the hacienda’s cost
of hiring labor that results from giving peasants access to more land. The second
condition is an analogously modiﬁed version of the labor monoponist’s pricing rule.
The production technology assumptions guarantee that equations (9)-(10) can be
solved for a unique set of equilibrium peasant sector oﬀ-farm labor and labor factor
supplies Tm and Lm.10
A more compact statement of the landlord’s ﬁrst-order conditions (9) and (10) is:
GT = FT − T
mFTT − L
mFTL
GL = FL − L
mFLL − T
mFLT
where function arguments have been suppressed and we’ve used (6) and (7) to ﬁnd
∂w(Tm,Lm)
∂Lm = −FLL(·,·) > 0 ,
∂r(Tm,Lm)






10Recall that F and G are homogenous of degree k<1. If k =1then only Tm/Lm can be
determined.
16This system of equations will in general be highly non-linear and closed form
solutions for Tm and Lm cannot be obtained even for fairly standard production
functional forms. Comparative static results for Tm and Lm with respect to the
model’s underlying parameters can be derived in the usual manner, but these too
will be non-linear and possibly non-monotone functions, and will in general depend
o na s s u m p t i o n sa b o u tt h et h i r dc r o s sp a r t i a ld e r i v a t i v e so ft h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o n .
To gain further insight, rather than derive messy expressions for the general case,
we turn instead to numeric simulations of the well known Cobb-Douglas production
function. Some further more general results follow below.
2.5 A Cobb-Douglas example
Consider the standard Cobb-Douglas production technology b F(T,L,S)=TαLβS1−α−β.
Farm skill or labor supervision ability S i sa s s u m e dt ob en o n - t r a d e da n dS =1across
all households. The restricted production function of interest becomes G(T,L)=
F(T,L)=TαLβ,w h e r eα+β < 1. Using some algebra, the ﬁrst order conditions (9)














1 − Lm − α
Tm
(1 − θ)t/(1 − λ) − Tm
¸
(12)
To get to these expressions we’ve used the fact that w(Tm,L m)=FL((1−θ)t/(1−
λ)−Tm,1−Lm) is the marginal product of labor on peasant farms and the wage rate
at which the hacienda hires labor, and r(Tm,L m)=FT((1−θ)t/(1−λ)−Tm,1−Lm)
is the marginal product of land on peasant farms and also the rental rate at which
the hacienda leases out land.
Unless the expressions in square brackets in (11) - (12) are unity, marginal factor
products will diverge across landlord and peasant farms. Further manipulation
reveals that the condition for FL/FT <G L/GT — or equivalently that the land to
labor be larger on landlord farms — can also be stated as Tm/Lm <
(1−θ)
(1−λ)t.11 This
condition is met automatically so long as the peasant sector hires land and sells labor
(Tm < 0,L m > 0) yet leaves room for situations where the latifundia sector expands
11Take the ratio of the two terms in square brackets. This term must be larger than one for
FL/GL <G L/GT. Rearranging terms leads to the desired result.
17to such an extent that the peasant sector actually begins to supply both labor and
land to landlords (Tm > 0). This last scenario is not as improbable as it may seem.
As demonstrated in the simulations below, at high levels of land inequality, and so
long as labor supervision S is not too important a factor in production, landlords
may decide to squeeze out peasant tenancy entirely in an all-out eﬀort to depress the
w a g e sa tw h i c hi th i r e sl a b o r .
Figures 1-4 illustrate how equilibrium allocations change at diﬀerent levels of
initial land inequality θ. The simulations are for an economy with λL =1landlord
and (1− λ)L =9 9peasant households. The land to labor ratio is t =1 . Production
is assumed to be close to constant returns to scale, with α =0 .49 and β =0 .49 (i.e.
F(T,L) is homogenous of degree k =0 .98). This last assumption assures that the
cost to the landlord of using less-eﬃcient large-scale wage labor production is positive,
but not too large. Smaller values of k = α+β and the non-tradability of S constrain
the landlord’s ability to exercise market power by raising the opportunity cost of large
scale wage-labor production relative to more eﬃcient production on subtenancies.
As discussed in detail in the section on technological change below, the assumption
of approximately constant returns to scale is not as important as it now may seem.
Much lower degrees of production homogeneity in F (lower values of α and β in the
Cobb-Douglas case) are consistent with strong market power eﬀects once we move
away from the unrealistic assumption that landlords have exactly the same skill,
technology and access to credit as peasants.
2.6 Landlords as multi-market oligopolists
“The scarcity of labor improved the bargaining strength of the worker.
Leases were lengthened, and the villein began to acquire exclusive rights
to his land. Only where the lords could eﬀectively collude rather than
compete for labor, as in Eastern Europe, could they thwart the changing
status (and income) of their former vassals... To the extent that lords
avoided competition for labor, they could prevent a rise in real wages, but
collusion over an area large enough to be eﬀective would require central-
ized political coercion.” (North and Thomas, The Rise of the Western
World, 1973: 24).
The analysis has thus far assumed that landlords as a group could collude to
18maximize total income. As North and Thomas suggest, without the use of political
coercion (which landlords as a class have an interest in supporting), collusion will
become diﬃcult particularly as the costs of labor mobility fall, or as other sectors of
the economy begin to compete with agriculture for labor. This section seeks to en-
dogenize the degree of collusion, and show how it varies with economic fundamentals.
Strategic interaction amongst oligopolists can, of course, be modeled in a variety
of ways. To ﬁx ideas, this section models this interaction as a case of multi-market
Cournot oligopolistic competition between an integer number N = λL of landlords.12
A sb e f o r e ,e a c hl a n d l o r do w n s θ




i now denote the net land supply and net labor supply from each peasant
household to a speciﬁcl a n d l o r di, where i =1 ...N. Then Tm =
PN
i=1 tm
i and Lm =
PN
i=1 lm
i respectively denote peasant household net supply of land and labor to the en-
tire landlord sector. Inverse peasant net supply functions for land and labor can now







































N). Landlord j’s decision prob-
lem is to choose Lm
j ,Tm
j so as to maximize proﬁts plus factor income, taking as given
other landlords’ choices Tm
−j,L m
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When there is more than one landlord (λL ≥ 2) there will be a strategic dimension
to landlords’ production decisions that was not previously present. We focus on the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium to this multi-market oligopoly problem. Diﬀerentiation of
(14) with respect to lm
j ,l m
j yields a set of ﬁrst-order conditions that are analogous to









−j) for each landlord. As all landlords are assumed identical, a symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is one where each landlord j =1 ...N
chooses (lm
j ,t m
j )=( lm,t m) and lm = b lm
j (tm...tm,l m...lm) and tm = b tm
j (tm...tm,l m...lm)
for all j.
It is instructive to compare the oligopsolist’s ﬁrst-order conditions to those of the
single monopsolist. In the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium we have Tm = λLtm





























When λL =1the conditions collapse exactly to the conditions (9)-(10) previously
derived for a single monopsolist (or a group of colluding monopsolists). When there
are two or more oligopolists, each oligopolist faces a more elastic set of peasant (net)
factor demands and therefore has less of an impact on wages or rentals from restricting
land supply or labor demand from the market. As λL rises, the two last terms on
the right-hand side of each equation vanish and the ﬁrst order conditions begin to
approximate those of the eﬃcient competitive solution.
Since it is evident that the perfect monopsoly and perfect competition equilibria
bracket the possible outcomes of the oligopoly case, without loss of generality we
focus on the simpler monopsoly case.
3 Comparative Statics
3.1 The impact of initial land inequality
“The persistence of labor shortages throughout the 19th century provided
the state with a further justiﬁcation for restricting access to landowner-
ship by a majority of its citizens ... [A] scarcity of labor was perceived
by the political elite as a major obstacle to economic development in gen-
eral, and to export promotion in particular. Thus the idea of converting
communal lands into family-sized holdings in private hands was seen as
counterproductive, because the farm-labor force would have little incen-
tive to seek outside employment.” (V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic
History of Latin America since Independence, 1994: 94).
20Figure 1 graphs equilibrium levels of peasant income V i
P and economy total in-
come V i
P + V i
R for diﬀerent levels of initial land inequality θ, under competitive,
price-discriminating, and monopsoly market structures (i = c,d,m )u s i n gt h eC o b b -
Douglas parameterization described above. Higher initial land inequality θ translates
into less land and income for peasants under any market structure, but peasant in-
come falls oﬀ more quickly with higher levels of land inequality when landlords can
exercise market power. For the chosen parameters, at low levels of initial land in-
equality (θ lower than 0.6) landlords are quite limited in how much market power
they are able to exploit and equilibrium allocations and payoﬀs stay close to the
competitive allocation. At higher levels of inequality θ, the potential gains to trade
from leasing out a larger fraction of landlord land rise, but the landlords ability to
exercise market power also increases, because peasant sector reservation autarky pay-
oﬀs begin rapidly to decline. When landlords are unable to price-discriminate, they
cannot lease out the eﬃcient level of land to peasants without undermining their own
pricing strategy, and so landlords drag economy-wide output V m
R + V m
p down below
the economy’s potential in order to extract rents.
Figure 2 illustrates how equilibrium net factor supplies change at diﬀerent levels
of initial inequality. The eﬃcient net supply of land to each peasant household under
the competitive or price discriminating monopolist case (−Tc) rises linearly with θ
(recall that Tc < 0). As households are all assumed to have the same labor endow-
ment, the eﬃcient level of net peasant labor supply is always zero. At low levels of
land inequality the monopsoly equilibrium closely approximates this eﬃcient factor
allocation, but at rising levels of inequality landlords withhold greater amounts of
land from the market. As peasant households have less land to use compared to
the competitive allocation, peasant labor supply to the landlord sector Lm increases
with θ. Figure 3 shows how the wage-rental rate faced by peasants is pushed down
with higher θ, and ﬁgure 4 shows the accompanying fall in the land to labor ratio on
peasant farms. As both land and wage labor use on the hacienda expand with higher
θ, so does hacienda output. Over the range of θ leading up to approximately θ =0 .7,
land use on the hacienda has grown faster than labor use so the land to labor ratio
has risen.
An interesting regime shift occurs at about θ =0 .7. At relatively low levels of
land inequality landlords earned most of their rents in the form of land monopoly
21rents and relatively less as monopsony rents from hiring peasant labor at below it’s
marginal product. But the relative proﬁtability of these two sources of rents switches
at higher levels of inequality. At about θ =0 .7, landlords’ supply of land has actually
dropped to zero, and at higher levels of θ landlords actually begin to lease in peasant
land. The main purpose of this strategy is of course to drive yet cheaper labor onto
the hacienda, even though this is clearly socially ineﬃcient since the marginal product
of land on the hacienda is by this point well below that on a peasant farm.
It is worth highlighting again that the properties of these equilibria result in part
because farming skill or labor supervision ability S plays a relatively minor role in
production and hence the production technology F(T,L) was close to constant returns
to scale. Had the role of S been more important, the economic opportunity costs of
operating a large hacienda would have mounted more rapidly, thus limiting landlords’
ability and willingness to exercise market power and hence dead-weight loss to the
economy. Technological change that augments the relative importance of farming
skill or labor supervision ability in peasant production could therefore act to limit
the exercise of market power, at least as long as peasant households retain access to
these inputs. But the converse is also true: things that raise the relative proﬁtability
of large scale production can help magnify the market power eﬀects we’ve isolated.
As discussed below, once this realistic possibility is considered, the assumption of
approximately constant returns to scale becomes inessential to the argument.
3.2 The eﬀects of population growth
“It follows that restrictions on the use of forest land may be imposed in
periods when labour, not land, is in short supply, but such measures by
which the landlord encroaches upon villagers’ rights in land tend to be-
come more frequent when increasing population pressure makes all kinds
of land —arable, grazing and forest land–more scarce, and such encroach-
ment very proﬁtable for the landlord.” (Ester Boserup, The Conditions
of Agricultural Growth, 1965: 84).
The model thus far has identiﬁed conditions of high initial land inequality as im-
portant in the emergence and persistence of a latifundia-minifundia complex. This
section analyzes how equilibrium agrarian structure might be aﬀected by other impor-
tant economic factors, such as population growth or the incorporation of new frontier
22lands, which would alter the economy-wide land to labor ratio. Economic historians
have hypothesized that the Latin American latifundia, and a host of colonial era in-
stitutions and regulations that compelled local populations to provide labor service
to large landlord estates, were institutional responses to the conditions of relative la-
bor scarcity that the Spanish colonizers encountered in the new world (Pearse, 1975;
de Janvry, 1981). Florescano (1987) has noted for example that the “two periods of
extensive land distribution [in Central Mexico], 1545-7 and 1585-95, were linked to
the great epidemics of 1545-7 and 1576-80 which decimated the Indian population
(p.256).”
It is important to note at the outset that an increase in the labor force can come
about in several diﬀerent ways, and how it comes about can make a diﬀerence. The
labor force can expand through growth in the average size of each farming household,
and/or because of the arrival of new households. To analyze these cases, let us change
the model and notation slightly so that there are now L − 1 peasant households and
just one landlord. Every household has H laborers. The landlord owns fraction θ
of the economy’s land T and the peasant households evenly divide the (1 − θ)T
remaining land units. The total labor force in the economy is now LH, the land to
labor endowment is tH = T/LH, and land per household is t = T/L.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of an increase in the number of peasant households on
eﬃcient production organization, while keeping household size H constant. On the
assumption that each new household brings non-traded farming skill S =1 ,e ﬃciency
in production requires the new farm households to be producers. The economy-wide
land to household ratio t has fallen. Per household demand for land falls because the
equilibrium operational farm size (also t) falls and with it the equilibrium competitive
wage-rental ratio. The landlords’ supply of land to the peasant sector, −Tc =
θT − t, increases slightly. Total output increases but output per household and per-
capita falls. Factor supplies in the discriminating market power case are identical to
this eﬃcient competitive case. Landlords however now beneﬁt from the falling wage-
rental ratio because peasant reservation payoﬀs fall as the average peasant household
owns less land when there are more households.
The eﬀe c t so fp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t ha r eq u i t ed i ﬀerent if we instead increase house-
hold size H while keeping the number of households constant. The eﬃcient com-
petitive allocation now entails the same L household farms each producing F(t,H).
23The land-to-household ratio (and hence farm size) will remain unchanged with an
increase in H. The equilibrium wage rental rate falls but the landlord’s supply of
−Tc = θT −t units of land to the peasant sector remains unchanged. Since a rise in
H increases the labor force without increasing the economy-wide stock of S, output
per capita falls more rapidly compared to the scenario of the last paragraph. The
more important the role of S in production, the more marked this diﬀerence will be.13
Consider next the eﬀect of these labor growth scenarios on equilibrium allocations
under monopsoly. Increasing household size H while keeping L ﬁxed does not alter
the number of farms;. nor does it aﬀect the landlord’s net supply of land to the
peasant sector. Doubling household size across all farms thus leaves land use patterns
unchanged while doubling labor supply to the hacienda at each level of land inequality
θ. This occurs because peasant households inelastically supply to the market all labor
that they cannot proﬁtably use on their own farms.
The impact of population growth is more interesting when we instead increase
L while keeping H ﬁxed. Figure 5 shows the eﬀect on equilibrium Tm and Lm of
doubling the number of peasant households in the economy from 100 to 200, under
the same Cobb-Douglas parameterization discussed above. Landlords withhold less
l a n df r o mt h em a r k e tr e l a t i v et ot h ee ﬃcient level (as indicated by Tm versus Tc in the
ﬁgure), the larger is the number of peasant producers in the economy. The reason
is that as each new peasant household brings non-traded factor S into production
, the landlord’s opportunity cost of organizing production ineﬃciently (withholding
land) rises when there are more peasant producers. At very high levels of initial land
inequality θ however (levels above 0.8 in the ﬁgure) landlords ﬁnd it just as proﬁtable
to encroach on peasant land anyway, and most of the new population still end up
working on the landlords’ hacienda rather than as independent farm producers.
These results cast new light on several historical discussions. The model conﬁrms
the observation that landlords’ incentive to withhold land from the market (and/or
to encroach upon peasant land) appears to be more pronounced in conditions of
labor scarcity, but clariﬁes that it is not so much labor scarcity per-se that favors the
latifundia, as much as the paucity of potentially independent peasant producers.
13A closely related scenario is the case of population growth due to the arrival of new households
that do not possess farming skills S. As these households would not carry out farm production they
hire out all labor and any land that they may own.
243.3 Skill accumulation and technological change
”[T]he owners of plantations have no interest in seeing knowledge of new
techniques or new seeds conveyed to the peasants ... [nor will they] sup-
port proposals for land settlement, and are often instead to be found
engaged in turning the peasants oﬀ their lands.” (A.W. Lewis, Economic
Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, 1954: 149)
Consider the eﬀect of increasing a landlord’s holding of factor S while holding
the peasant population’s ﬁxed at S =1 . For example, in the Cobb-Douglas case
the landlord’s production function can be written AF(T,L)=TαLβS1−α−β where
A = S1−α−β, while production remains F(T,L)=TαLβ in the peasant sector where
S =1 . An increase in the landlords’ A while keeping peasant production technology
unchanged may be associated with a relative increase in skill accumulation, in total
factor productivity, or in the price of landlord crops relative to peasant production.
Ar i s ei nt h er e l a t i v ep r o ﬁtability of landlord production such as this would nat-
urally lead landlord farms to operate on a larger scale, even in the eﬃcient competi-
tive case. At constant product prices, the peasant sector ought to beneﬁtf r o ms u c h
changes because the equilibrium wage rate ought to rise as landlord demand for labor
increases. Speciﬁcally, in a new competitive equilibrium landlords’ land and labor
usage will be τ =(1
A)
1
k−1 times as large than on peasant farms. Peasant factor use
falls to Lu = 1
(τλ+(1−λ)) and Tu = 1
(τλ+(1−λ))t respectively and equilibrium wage and
rental rates rise to w = FL(Tu,L u) and r = FT(Tu,L u) respectively. For reference,
recall that in the earlier competitive benchmark scenario Lu =1and Tu = t.
When landlords exercise monopsoly power, a similar improvement on the farm of
landlords’ may instead result in immiserizing growth for the peasant sector. The
reason is that an increase in the landlords’ S lowers the eﬃciency cost of running
a large farm and, by increasing labor demand also increases the scope for earning
monopsony rents on wage labor.
This possibility is illustrated in ﬁgure 7. The lower and upper solid lines repro-
duce, respectively the net supply of land from the landlord to the peasant sector and
the total net peasant labor supply to the landlord’s estate from the earlier monopsoly
analysis. The dashed lines in the ﬁgure show how each of these net factor supply
curves change as a consequence of a ﬁve-fold increase in a landlord’s skill level from
25S =1to S =5while keeping all else equal.
A slight vertical displacement in each of these two factor supply schedules is to be
expected given the rise in total factor productivity on the landlords’ farm. The ex-
pected equilibrium displacement competitive is in fact rather small, as approximated
in the ﬁgure by the vertical displacement at low levels of inequality (where allocations
approximate their eﬃcient competitive levels). But at intermediate to high levels
of land inequality we observe a far more aggressive eﬀort by landlords to withhold
land from the lease market compared to when they are less skilled. This leads to a
much larger supply of peasant labor to the landlords’ estate at each level of initial
inequality.
Although the eﬃcient competitive wage will increase slightly as a result of the
landlords’ skill accumulation, equilibrium wage rates paid to peasants in the monop-
soly case can be shown to actually fall at intermediate to high levels of inequality
because of landlords’ increased ability to exercise market power. Arguably, some-
thing similar to this is what happened in Chile in the historical episode described
above. More of the windfall gains from new export opportunities and technical
change accrued to wages in neighboring Argentina because labor there was more
mobile and land markets less concentrated.
This discussion also demonstrates that the earlier assumption of approximately
constant returns to scale of F(T,L), was not at all essential to the emergence of strong
market power eﬀects.14 In general, anything that helps to lower the landlords’ mar-
ginal cost of being big makes the exercise of market power more likely and proﬁtable.
Credit market imperfections or agricultural policies that favor largeholders could have
this eﬀect as well.
3.4 Property rights conﬂicts and politics
“So one of the hacendados’ principal strategies for acquiring workers was,
precisely, to seize the lands of the Indian communities.” (Enrique Flores-
ciano, The Hacienda in New Spain, 1987: 267)
Thus far we have treated the initial distribution of property rights over land as
14The earlier assumption that landlords had absolutely no technological, political or transacting
advantage over small peasant producers had in fact had strongly stacked the decks against market
power eﬀects. Yet such eﬀects nonetheless emerged at high enough levels of land inequality.
26given and secure. In practice property rights are however frequently contested, and
agents in the economy have incentives to invest both in private and collective eﬀorts
to shape property rights in their favor. For example landlords have at times used
violence and legal manipulations to encroach upon peasant lands via land grabs,
evictions. Peasants also at times contest landlords’ property rights by squatting or
by mobilizing in support of land reform. In stark contrast to the United States,
landlords in Latin America have shaped the evolution of land policies in their favor,
denying rural lower classes access to the vast available areas of frontier lands (Huber
and Saﬀord, 1995; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
Without explicitly modeling property rights conﬂicts, the model suggests where
property rights conﬂicts are most likely. To see this notice that a redistribution of
property rights is equivalent to a change in θ. Under competitive markets no agent
would be willing to pay more than the ﬁxed market rental rate to obtain or protect
another unit of land. For given factor endowments, the marginal product of land
remains constant at FT(t,1) and is independent of θ. When landlords can exercise
market power however the private marginal return to land is increasing in θ for both





















The expressions above state that the marginal impact of an increase in θ on landlord
income is always higher when the landlord has discriminating market power compared




















The marginal incentive to challenge property rights thus rises with the initial level
of land inequality in the market power case. This suggests that latent or actual
property rights conﬂicts are much more likely to arise in economies where higher
initial inequality allows landlords to exercise monopsony power. Speciﬁcally one
would expect to see costly ex-ante investments to encroach upon the property rights
of others, or to protect one’s own property rights against the challenges of others







∂θ may be reversed depending on θ. It can nonetheless be shown that the desired
result holds for low enough or high enough θ.
27when land inequality is high and landlords can exercise market power. More speciﬁc
assumptions about how property rights conﬂicts arise and are resolved are needed to
make more precise predictions however.16
The land rental market and the land sales market are essentially one and the same
in this static setting. The same reasoning extends naturally to the multi-period
setting: landlords who cannot price discriminate withhold land from the market
because to sell or lease out any more land would only undercut their market power.
The model explains why an ineﬃciently low volume of transactions might persist
through time without having to appeal to credit market imperfections or transaction
costs.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In a detailed historical account, Arnold Bauer (1971, 1975) chronicles the rise and
consolidation of Chile’s large landlord estates and the associated system of labor ser-
vice tenancies known as inquilinaje, during the second half of the nineteenth century.
His analysis helps put to rest the common myth of ineﬃcient landlords more preoc-
cupied with status than by proﬁt, by demonstrating that estate production in fact
responded very ﬂexibly to the new opportunities created by new wheat export mar-
kets and falling transport costs. During this period agriculture and labor demand
boomed, as the area under wheat cultivation more than tripled between 1850 and
1870.
In neighboring Argentina where landownership was relatively less concentrated
and labor more scarce, a similar agricultural boom led to rising wages, increased
mechanization and more open immigration policies, as conventional theory would
have predicted. Yet, according to Bauer, in Chile the outcome was diﬀe r e n ta s“ t h e
information that is available suggests that real wages stayed constant and may have
decreased slightly (p.1079)” over the period. Rather than raise wages, landlords
satisﬁed their demand for labor by “tightening of the screws on the service tenants
(p. 1074)” and by restructuring their estates so as to bring in more labor service
16See for example Hotte ([25]) and references therein for a discussion of models that specify
property rights encroachment and protection functions. Conning and Robinson (2000) analyze a
linear production technology model where landlords organize production ineﬃciently in an eﬀort to
lower tenants’ incentives to challenge property rights through the political system.
28tenants17 but reducing average tenants’ plot sizes while increasing labor service oblig-
ations. Bauer reports that in some regions tenants’ labor service obligations doubled
or tripled.
Bauer’s account of this period appears puzzling to standard economic theory, yet
the observed pattern is readily reconciled to the model in this paper. In particular,
I have argued that under conditions of suﬃcient land concentration, an increase in
labor demand on landlord farms can lead to an increase in landlords’ ability to exercise
market power and to declining or stagnant equilibrium wages.
Several other stylized features of what has at times been dubbed the ‘backward’
agrarian economy (Basu, 1997) emerge as equilibrium features of this simple agrar-
ian economy with endogenous levels of market power. Where the ability to price
discriminate is limited, landlords become willing to carry out production on an in-
eﬃciently large scale and an inverse farm size-productivity relationship emerges as
yield per hectare on smaller, more labor intensive farms exceeds that measured on
larger landlord farms. Although landlords’ ability to price discriminate helped to
restore eﬃciency, it do so at the expense of peasant welfare, and the contracts that
they would employ resembled the sort of labor service-tenancy contract that have
historically found to be widely prevalent in many parts of the world.
The conditions that most likely led to the emergence and persistence of ineﬃcient
production organization included high initial land inequality, the ability of landlords
to collude, a production technology that was approximately constant returns to scale
in land and labor inputs. This last assumption was associated with a production
technology where non-traded farming skills or labor supervision abilities that might
have strongly favored small farm production did not play a big role. More generally,
anything in the production environment that gives an advantage to being large can
s t r e n g t h e nt h ee x e r c i s eo fm a r k e tp o w e r . T his helps to explain the historical ob-
servation that many of Latin America’s large latifundia become consolidated during
periods of export growth and technological change.
While economic historians have attributed the rise of the latifundia in Latin Amer-
ica to conditions of labor scarcity, this paper has argued that the eﬀect of population
17Bauer (1975) calculates that approximately 35,000 inquilinos and permanent workers and
125,000 day laborers worked on estates in 1865. The next comparable data from the 1930 agricul-
tural census shows inquilinos and permanent workers nearly doubling to 67,000 while the number
of day laborers stood at 133,000. These ﬁgures count only inquilino heads of households.
29growth on agrarian organization depends in important ways on the nature of the pro-
duction technology, and on whether or not new arrivals into the labor force possess
non-traded skills or other factors of production.
While most of the paper has focused on scenarios where property rights over
land were secure and involuntary labor service could not be compelled, the model
predicts that agent’s incentive to resort to extra-legal mechanisms to encroach upon
the property rights of others (or to defend against others’ encroachment) will be
most pronounced in precisely the same situations where the potential for capturing
monopsoly rents is highest. The principle at work is quite general: landlords who
withhold land from the market raise the price of land access to levels well above
the social marginal product of land. Agents are therefore much more likely to
spend resources to encroach upon the property of others, and/or to defend their own
property compared to a competitive factor market where no agent would ever be
willing to pay more than the social marginal product of land (the equilibrium market
price) for access to an additional unit of land.
A longer time horizon and a land sales market does not undo the observed inef-
ﬁciencies in the economy for precisely the same reason that the land rental market
operates at less than the eﬃcient level in the one period case: a higher volume of land
sales would only dilute landlords’ market power. Since the problem is not due to
the absence of a credit market, so called ‘market-assisted’ land reforms — where the
government or some other intermediary helps ﬁnance peasant land purchases — will
not help improve eﬃciency unless the government can compel landlords to sell land
at truly competitive market prices rather than at manipulated market prices.
1.0
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33Figure 1: Peasant Sector and Total Income under different market structures as a function of θ










Total CompetitiveFigure 2: Equilibrium Net Factor Supplies as a function of θ



















yFigure 3: Equilibrium Wage and Rental rates as a function of θ






rentalFigure 4: Equilibrium Land-Labor ratios as a function of θ








Peasant T/L endowmentFigure 5 : Effects of an increase in the number of Peasant Households














cFigure 6: An increase in landlord skill can increase market power effects
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